Abstract. We present a new block cipher LED. While dedicated to compact hardware implementation, and offering the smallest silicon footprint among comparable block ciphers, the cipher has been designed to simultaneously tackle three additional goals. First, we explore the role of an ultra-light (in fact non-existent) key schedule. Second, we consider the resistance of ciphers, and LED in particular, to related-key attacks: we are able to derive simple yet interesting AES-like security proofs for LED regarding related-or single-key attacks. And third, while we provide a block cipher that is very compact in hardware, we aim to maintain a reasonable performance profile for software implementation.
Introduction
Over past years many new cryptographic primitives have been proposed for use in RFID tag deployments, sensor networks, and other applications characterised by highly-constrained devices. The pervasive deployment of tiny computational devices brings with it many interesting, and potentially difficult, security issues.
Chief among recent developments has been the evolution of lightweight block ciphers where an accumulation of advances in algorithm design, together with an increased awareness of the likely application, has helped provide important developments. To some commentators the need for yet another lightweight block cipher proposal will be open to question. However, in addition to the fact that many proposals present some weaknesses [2, 10, 45] , we feel there is still more to be said on the subject and we observe that it is in the "second generation" of work that designers might learn from the progress, and omissions, of "first generation" proposals. And while new proposals might only slightly improve on successful initial proposals in terms of a single metric, e.g. area, they might, at the same time, overcome other important security and performance limitations. In this paper, therefore, we return to the design of lightweight block ciphers and we describe Light Encryption Device, LED.
During our design, several key observations were uppermost in our mind. Practically all modern block cipher proposals have reasonable security arguments; but few offer much beyond (potentially thorough) ad hoc analysis. Here we hope to provide a more complete security treatment than is usual. In particular, related-key attacks are often dismissed from consideration for the application areas that typically use such constrained devices, e.g. RFID tags. In practice this is often perfectly reasonable. However, researchers will continue to derive cryptanalytic results in the related-key model [18, 2] and there has been some research on how to modify or strengthen key schedules [35, 15, 39] . So having provable levels of resistance to such attacks would be a bonus and might help confusion developing in the cryptographic literature.
In addition, our attention is naturally focused on the performance of the algorithm on the tag. However, there can be constraints when an algorithm is also going to be implemented in software. This is something that has already been discussed with the design of KLEIN [22] and in the design of LED we have aimed at very compact hardware implementation while maintaining some software-friendly features.
Our new block cipher is based on AES-like design principles and this allows us to derive very simple bounds on the number of active Sboxes during a block cipher encryption. Since the key schedule is very simple, this analysis can be done in a related-key model as well; i.e. our bounds apply even when an attacker tries to mount a related-key attack. And while AES-based approaches are well-suited to software, they don't always provide the lightest implementation in hardware. But using techniques presented in [23] we aim to resolve this conflict.
While block ciphers are an important primitive, and arguably the most useful in a constrained environment, there has also been much progress in the design of stream ciphers [14, 25] and even, very recently, in lightweight hash functions [23, 4] . In fact it is this latter area of work that has provided inspiration for LED.
The version presented here includes a minor modification to the original description of [46] . While no weaknesses were reported in LED, we have taken the opportunity to modify the specifications so as to process more key material per round, when the key size is not a multiple of 64 bits, and to use constants whose value depends on the key size. The efficiency and security analysis have required some minor modification and these sections have been updated accordingly.
Design approach and specifications
Like so much in today's symmetric cryptography, an AES-like design appears to be the ideal starting point for a clean and secure design. The design of LED will inevitably have many parallels with this established approach, and features such as Sboxes, ShiftRows, and (a variant of) MixColumns will all take their familiar roles.
For the key schedule we chose to do-away with the "schedule"; instead the user-provided key is used repeatedly as is. As well as giving obvious advantages in hardware implementation, it allows for simple proofs to be made for the security of the scheme even in the most challenging attack model of related keys. At first sight the re-use of the encryption key without variation appears dangerous, certainly to those familiar with slide attacks and some of their advanced variants [7, 8] . But such a simple key schedule is not without precedent [42] though the treatment here is more complete than previously.
The LED cipher is described in Section 2.1. It is a 64-bit block cipher with two primary instances taking 64-and 128-bit keys. The cipher state is conceptually arranged in a (4×4) grid where each nibble represents an element from GF(2 4 ) with the underlying polynomial for field multiplication given by X 4 + X + 1.
Sboxes. LED cipher re-uses the present Sbox which has been adopted in many lightweight cryptographic algorithms. The action of this box in hexadecimal notation is given by the following table. MixColumnsSerial. We re-use the tactic adopted in [23] to define an MDS matrix for linear diffusion that is suitable for compact serial implementation. The MixColumnsSerial layer can be viewed as four applications of a hardware-friendly matrix A with the net result being equivalent to using the MDS matrix M where
The basic component of LED will be a sequence of four identical rounds used without the addition of any key material. This basic unit, that we later call "step", makes it easy to establish security bounds for the construction. This is the initial value of the cipher state and note that the state is loaded row-wise rather than in the column-wise fashion we have come to expect from the AES; this is a more hardware-friendly choice, as pointed out in [38] . The key is viewed nibble-wise 4 and we denote k 0 , k 1 , . . ., k l the l nibbles of the key. Then the i-th subkey SK i , also arranged (conceptually) in a square array:
Specification of LED
    the two first subkeys for the 80-bit key case
    all alternating subkeys for the 128-bit key case
The operation addRoundKey(state,SK i ) combines nibbles of subkey SK i with the state, respecting array positioning, using bitwise exclusive-or. Encryption is described using addRoundKey(state,SK i ) and a second operation, step(state). This is illustrated in Figure 1 . The number of steps s during encryption depends on the key size. For 64-bit key, s = 8. For bigger key sizes up to 128 bits, s = 12. for
The operation step(state) consists of four rounds of encryption of the cipher state. Each of these four rounds uses, in sequence, the operations AddConstants, SubCells, ShiftRows, and MixColumnsSerial as illustrated in Figure 2 .
AddConstants. A round constant is defined as follows. At each round, six bits (rc 5 , rc 4 , rc 3 , rc 2 , rc 1 , rc 0 ) are shifted one position to the left with the new value to rc 0 being computed as rc 5 ⊕ rc 4 ⊕ 1. The six bits are initialised to zero, and updated before use in a given round. We also denote (ks 7 , ks 6 , . . . ks 0 ) the 8 bits representing the key size in bits, with ks 7 being the MSB. The constant, when used in a given round, is arranged into an array as follows: 
The round constants are combined with the state, respecting array positioning, using bitwise exclusive-or. The values of the (rc 5 , rc 4 , rc 3 , rc 2 , rc 1 , rc 0 ) constants for each round are given in the Appendix.
SubCells. Each nibble in the array state is replaced by the nibble generated after using the present Sbox.
ShiftRow. Row i of the array state is rotated i cell positions to the left, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3.
MixColumnsSerial. Each column of the array state is viewed as a column vector and replaced by the column vector that results after post-multiplying the vector by the matrix M (see earlier description in this section).
The final value of the state provides the ciphertext with nibbles of the "array" being unpacked in the obvious way. Test vectors for LED are provided in the Appendix.
Security Analysis
The LED block cipher is simple to analyze and this allows us to precisely evaluate the necessary number of rounds to ensure proper security.
Our scheme is meant to be resistant to classical attacks, but also to the type of relatedkey attacks that have been effective against AES-256 [9] and other ciphers [2] . We will even study the security of LED in a hash function setting, i.e. when it is used in a DaviesMeyer or similar construction with a compression function based on a block cipher. In other words, we will consider attackers that have full access to the key(s) and try to distinguish the fixed permutations from randomly chosen ones. While this analysis provides additional confidence in the security of LED, it is not our intent to propose a hash function construction.
We chose a conservative number of rounds for LED. For example, when handling a 64-bit key we use 32 AES-like rounds that are grouped as eight "big" add-key/apply-permutation steps that are each composed of four AES-like rounds. Further, our security margins are even more conservative if one definitively disregards related-key attacks; as will be seen with the following proofs.
The key schedule
The LED key schedule has been chosen for its simplicity and security. Because it is very simple to analyze, it allows us to directly derive a bound on the minimal number of active Sboxes, even in the scenario of related-key attacks. The idea is to first compute a bound on the number of active big steps (each composed of 4 AES-like rounds). Then, using the well known 4-round proofs for the AES, one can show that one active big step will contain at least 25 active Sboxes. Note that this bound is tight as we know 4-round differential paths containing exactly this number of active Sboxes.
When not considering related-key attacks, we directly obtain that any differential path for LED will contain at least s · 25 active Sboxes. For related-key attacks, we have to distinguish between the different key-size versions.
64-bit key version.
If we assume that differences are inserted in the key input, then every subkey SK i in the 64-bit key variant of LED will be active. Therefore, one can easily see that it is impossible to force two consecutive non-active big steps and we are ensured that for every two big steps at least one is active. Overall, this shows that any related-key differential path contains at least s/2 · 25 active Sboxes.
65 to 128-bit key version. Let's assume that the key is 128-bit long. If we assume that differences are inserted in the key input, then we have to separate two cases. If the two independent parts K 1 and K 2 composing the key both contain a difference, then we end up with exactly the same reasoning as for the 64-bit key variant: at least s/2 · 25 active Sboxes will be active. If only one of the two independent parts composing the key contains a difference, then subkeys with and without differences are alternatively incorporated after each big step. The non-active subkeys impact on the differential paths is completely void and thus in this case one can view LED as being composed of even bigger steps of 8 AESlike rounds instead. The very same reasoning then applies again: it is impossible to force two consecutive of these new bigger steps to be inactive and therefore we have at least s/4 · 50 active Sboxes ensured for any differential path (since the best differential path for 8 rounds trivially contains 50 active Sboxes). The reasoning is identical for smaller key sizes, but the bound on the number of active Sboxes is not tight anymore, thus indicating that the real number of active Sboxes might actually be higher than expected.
We summarize in Table 1 the results obtained for the two main versions of LED, both for single-key attacks and related-key attacks. Note that the bounds on the number of active Sboxes are tight as we know differential paths meeting them (for example the truncated differential path for each active big step can simply be any of the 4-round path for AES-128 with 25 active Sboxes).
For LED-128, since we are using two independent key parts one can peel off the first and last key addition (which is always the first key part K 1 ). Thus, an attacker can remove one big step on each side of the cipher, for a total of 8 rounds, with a complexity of 2 64 tries on K 1 . This partially explains why the versions of LED using two independent key parts have 16 more rounds than for LED-64. 
Differential/Linear cryptanalysis
Since LED is an AES-like cipher, one can directly reuse extensive work that has been done on the AES. We will compute a bound on the best differential path probability (where all differences on the input and output of all rounds are specified) or even the best differential probability (where only the input and output differences are specified), in both single-and related-key settings.
As the best differential transition probability of the PRESENT Sbox is 2 −2 , using the previously proven minimal number of active Sboxes we deduce that the best differential path probability on 4 active rounds of LED is upper bounded by 2 −2·25 = 2 −50 . By adapting the work from [40] , the maximum differential probability for 4 active rounds of LED is upper bounded by
where DP S (i, j) stands for the differential probability of the Sbox to map the difference i to j. The duality between linear and differential attacks allows us to similarly apply the same approaches to compute a bound on the best linear approximation. Over four rounds the best linear approximation probability is upper bounded by 2 −50 and the best linear hull probability is upper bounded by 2 −32 . Since we previously proved that all rounds will be active in the single-key scenario and half of them will be active in the related-key scenario, we can easily compute the upper bounds on the best differential path probability and the best linear approximation probability for each version of LED (see Table 1 ). Note that this requires that random subkeys be used at each round to make the Sbox inputs independent. In the case of LED the subkeys are simulated by the addition of round constants and the derived bounds give a very good indication of the quality of the LED internal permutation with regards to linear and differential cryptanalysis.
Cube testers and algebraic attacks
We applied the most recent developed cube testers [3] and its zero-sum distinguishers to the LED fixed-key permutation, the best we could find within practical time complexity is at most three rounds (with the potential to be doubled under a meet-in-the-middle scenario). Note, in case of AES, "zero-sum" property is also referred as "balanced", found by the AES designers [16] , in which 3-round balanced property is shown. To the best of our knowledge, there is no balanced property found for more than 3 AES rounds.
The PRESENT Sbox used in LED has algebraic degree 3 and one can check that 3 · r/4 · 25 ≫ 64 for all LED variants. Moreover, the PRESENT Sbox is described by e = 21 quadratic equations in the v = 8 input/output-bit variables over GF (2). The entire system for a fixed-key LED permutation therefore consists of (16 · r · e) quadratic equations in (16 · r · v) variables. For example, in the case of the 64-bit key version, we end up with 10752 equations in 4096 variables. In comparison, the entire system for a fixed-key AES permutation consists of 6400 equations in 2560 variables. While the applicability of algebraic attacks on AES remains unclear, those numbers tend to indicate that LED offers a high level of protection.
Other cryptanalysis
The slide attack is a block cipher cryptanalysis technique [7] that exploits the degree of self-similarity of a permutation. In the case of LED, all rounds are made different thanks to the round-dependent constants addition, which makes the slide attack impossible to perform. Note that the key size dependent constants also separate the versions of LED with different key sizes.
Integral cryptanalysis is a technique first applied on SQUARE [17] that is particularly efficient against block ciphers based on substitution-permutation networks, like AES or LED. The idea is to study the propagation of sums of values; something which is quite powerful on ciphers that only use bijective components. As for AES, the best integral property can be found on three rounds, or four rounds with the last mixing layer removed. Thus, two big LED steps avoid any such observation. Considering the large number of rounds of LED, we believe integrals attacks are very unlikely to be a threat.
Rotational cryptanalysis [28] studies the evolution of a rotated variant of some input words through the round process. It was proven to be quite successful against some Addition-Rotation-XOR (ARX) block ciphers and hash functions. LED is an Sbox-oriented block cipher and any rotation property in a cell will be directly removed by the application of the Sbox layer. Even if one looks for a rotation property of cell positions, this is unlikely to lead to an attack since the constants used in a LED round are all distinct and any position rotation property between columns or lines is removed after the application of two rounds.
Methods to find better bounds on the algebraic degree were recently published in [12] . With the first two rounds combined as Super-Sboxes, the best algebraic degree we can find for fixed-key LED permutation and its inverse are 3, 11, 33, 53, 60, 62, for r rounds with r = 1, . . . , 6. Using this technique, one can distinguish up to 12 rounds with complexity bounded by 2 63 , in the known key model.
LED in a hash function setting
Studying a block cipher in a hash function setting is a good security test since it is very advantageous for the attacker. In this scenario the attacker will have full control of all inputs. In the so-called known-key [29] or chosen-key models, the attacker can have access or even choose the key(s) used, and the goal is then to find some input/output pairs having a certain property with a complexity lower than what is expected for randomly chosen permutation(s). Typically, the property is that the input and output differences or values are fixed to a certain subset of the whole domain.
While we conduct an analysis of the security of LED in a hash function setting, we would like to emphasize that our goal is not to build a secure hash function. However, we believe that this section adds further confidence in the quality of our block cipher proposal.
Rebound and Super-Sbox attacks. The recent rebound attack [37] and its improved variants (start-from-the-middle attack [36] and Super-Sbox cryptanalysis [21, 31] ) have much improved the best known attacks on many hash functions, especially for AES-based schemes. The attacker will first prepare a differential path and then use the available freedom degrees to the most costly part of the trail (often in the middle) so as to reduce the overall complexity. The costly part is called the controlled rounds, while the rest of the trail are the uncontrolled rounds and they are verified probabilistically. The rebound attack and its variants allow the attacker to nicely use the freedom degrees so that the controlled part is as big as possible. At the present time, the most powerful technique in the known-key setting allows the attacker to control three rounds and no method is known to control more rounds, even if the key is chosen by the attacker.
In order to ease the analysis we assume, pessimistically, that the attacker can control four rounds, that is one full active big step, with a negligible computation/memory cost (even if one finds a method to control four AES-like rounds in the chosen-key model, it will not apply here since no key is inserted during four consecutive rounds). In the case of 64-bit key LED, the attacker can control two independent active big steps and later merge them by freely fixing the key value. However, even in this advantageous scenario for the attacker we are ensured that at least two big steps will be active and uncontrolled, and this seems sufficient to resist distinguishing attacks. Indeed, for two active big steps of LED, the upper bound for the best differential path probability and the best linear approximation probability (respectively the best differential probability and the best linear hull probability) is 2 −100 (respectively 2 −64 ).
For the 128-bit key version, we can again imagine that the attacker controls and merges two active big steps with a negligible computation/memory cost. Even if so, with the same reasoning we are ensured that at least four big steps will be active and uncontrolled, and again this seems sufficient since for four active big steps of LED, the upper bound for the best differential path probability and the best linear approximation probability (respectively the best differential probability and the best linear hull probability) is 2 −200 (respectively 2 −128 ).
The best attack we could find on LED-64 when the attacker gets to choose the keys is a distinguisher on 15 rounds: a single-nibble difference is set on the key and the SuperSbox technique is used in order to find an internal state value mapping this single-nibble difference to itself through four rounds. As a consequence, the four rounds before and after will contain no difference, and one can even add 3 more rounds by letting the difference spread a little forward and backward without reducing too much the generic complexity. Overall, with a complexity of about 2 16 operations, one can distinguish 15 rounds of LED-64 from a random permutation of the same size. In the case of LED-128, the same reasoning applies by setting a single-nibble difference to the first key and no difference to the second one. Again, the Super-Sbox technique is used in order to find an internal state value mapping this single-nibble difference to itself through four rounds and we use the second key value to connect two such internal state values. As a consequence, the eight rounds before and after will contain no difference, and one can again add 3 more rounds by letting the difference spread a little forward and backward. Overall, with a complexity of about 2 16 operations, one can distinguish 27 rounds of LED-128 from a random permutation of the same size.
Integral attacks. One can directly adapt the known-key variant of integral attacks from [29] to the LED internal permutation. However, this attack can only reach seven rounds with complexity 2 28 , which is worse than what can be obtained with previous rebound-style attacks.
Performance and Comparison

Hardware implementation
We used Mentor Graphics ModelSimXE 6.4b and Synopsys DesignCompiler A-2007.12-SP1 for functional simulation and synthesis of the designs to the Virtual Silicon (VST) standard cell library UMCL18G212T3, which is based on the UMC L180 0.18µm 1P6M logic process with a typical voltage of 1.8 V. For synthesis and for power estimation (using Synopsys Power Compiler version A-2007.12-SP1 ) we advised the compiler to keep the hierarchy and use a clock frequency of 100 KHz, which is a widely cited operating frequency for RFID applications. Note that the wire-load model used, though it is the smallest available for this library, still simulates the typical wire-load of a circuit with a size of around 10, 000 GE.
To substantiate our claims on the hardware efficiency of our LED family, we have implemented LED-64 and LED-128 in VHDL and simulated their post-synthesis performance. As can be seen in Figure 3 , our serialized design consists of seven modules: MCS, State, AK, AC, SC, Controller, and Key State.
State comprises a 4 · 4 array of flip-flop cells storing 4 bits each. Every row constitutes a shift-register using the output of the last stage, i.e. column 0, as the input to the first stage (column 3) of the same row and the next row. Using this feedback functionality ShiftRows can be performed in 3 clock cycles with no additional hardware costs. Further, since MixColumnsSerial is performed on column 0, also a vertical shifting direction is required for this column. Consequently, columns 0 and 3 consist of flip-flop cells with two inputs (6 GE), while columns 1 and 2 can be realized with flip-flop cells with only one input (4.67 GE).
The key is stored in Key State, which comprises of a 4-bit wide simple shift register of the appropriate length, i.e. 64 or 128. Please note that the absence of a key-schedule of LED has two advantages: it allows 1) to use the most basic, and thus cheapest, flip-flops (4.67 GE per bit); and 2) to hardwire the key in case no key update is required. In the latter case additional combinational logic is required to select the appropriate key chunk, which reduces the savings to 278 GE and 577 GE for LED-64 and LED-128, respectively.
For arbitrary key lengths the area requirements grow by 4.67 GE per bit. An LED-80 with the same parameters as PRESENT-80 would thus require approximately 1, 040 GE with a flexible key and around 690 GE with fixed key.
MCS calculates the last row of A in one clock cycle. The result is stored in the State module, that is in the last row of column 0, which has been shifted upwards at the same time. Consequently, after 4 clock cycles the MixColumnsSerial operation is applied to an entire column. Then the whole state array is rotated by one position to the left and the next column is processed. As an example of the hardware efficiency of MCS we depict A in the upper and its sub-components in the lower right part of Figure 3 . In total only 40 GE and 20 clock cycles are required to perform MCS, which is 4 clock cycles slower but 85% smaller than a serialized implementation of the AES MixColumns [24] . If we take into account that AES operates on 8 bits and not like LED on 4 bits, the area savings are still more than 40%.
AK performs the AddRoundKey operation by XORing the roundkey every fourth round. For this reason the input to the XNOR gate is gated with a NAND gate.
AC performs one part of the AddConstant operation by XORing the first column of the round constant matrix (a simple arithmetic 2-bit counter) to the first column of the state matrix. For this reason, the input to the XNOR gate is gated with a NAND gate. In order to use a single control signal for the addition of the round constants, which span over the first two columns, the addition of the second column of the round constant matrix to the second column of the state array is performed in the State module.
SC performs the SubCells operation and consists of a single instantiation of the corresponding Sbox. We used an optimized Boolean representation of the PRESENT Sbox, 5 which only requires 22.33 GE. It takes 16 clock cycles to perform AddConstant and SubCells on the whole state.
Controller uses a Finite State Machine (FSM) to generate all control signals required. The FSM consists of one idle state, one init state to load the initial values, one state for the combined execution of AC and SC, 3 states for ShR and two states for MCS (one for processing one column and another one to rotate the whole state to the left). Several LFSR-based counters are required: 6-bit for the generation of the second column of the round constants matrix, 4-bit for the key addition scheduling and 2-bit for the transition conditions of the FSM. Besides, a 2-bit arithmetic counter is required for the generation of the first column of the round constants matrix. Its LSB is also used to select either the 3 MSB rc 5 ||rc 4 ||rc 3 or the 3 LSB rc 2 ||rc 1 ||rc 0 of the 6-bit LFSR-based counter. In total the control logic sums up to 199 GE.
It requires 39 clock cycles to perform one round of LED, resulting in a total latency of 1248 clock cycles for LED-64 and 1872 clock cycles for LED-128. The estimated power consumption at a frequency of 100 KHz and a supply voltage ov 1.8V is 1.67µW for LED-64 (1.11µW with a hard-wired key) and 2.2µW for LED-128 (1.11µW). It is a well-known fact that at low frequencies, as typical for low-cost applications, the power consumption is dominated by its static part, which is proportional to the amount of transistors involved. Furthermore, the power consumption strongly depends on the used technology and greatly varies with the simulation method. To address these issues and to reflect the time-areapower trade-off inherent in any hardware implementation a new figure of merit (FOM) was proposed by [5] . In order to have a fair comparison, we omit the power values in Table 2 and only compare cycles per block, throughput at 100 KHz (in kilo bits per second), the area requirements (in GE), and FOM (in nano bits per clock cycle per GE squared). Table 2 compares our results to previous work, sorted according to key flexibility and increasing security levels. Note that we have not been able to include all recent proposals and we have restricted ourselves to block ciphers for our comparison. Other techniques such as hummingbird [19] and armadillo [5] are of some interest in the literature, though attacks on early versions have lead to some redesign [45, 1, 20] . As can be seen from Table 2 , the block cipher LED is the smallest when compared to other block ciphers with similar key and block size.
Software implementation
We have made two implementations of LED; one for reference and clarity with the second being optimized for performance (by using table lookups). The measurements were taken on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU Q 720 clocked at 1.60GHz.
In the optimised implementation, we represent the LED state as a single 64-bit word and we build eight lookup tables each with 256 64-bit entries. This is similar to many AES implementations, except we treat two consecutive nibbles (2 × 4 bits) as a unit for the lookup table. Hence SubCells, ShiftRows and MixColumnsSerial can all be achieved using eight table lookups and XORs.
Overall, we need to access 8 × 32 × 2 = 512 32-bit words of memory (or 8 × 32 = 256 64-bit words of memory). In contrast, an AES implementation with four tables of 256 entries would require (16 + 4) × 10 = 200 accesses. This suggests that LED-64 should be about 2.5 times slower than AES on 32-bit platforms with table-based implementations, and similarly LED-128 will be 3.8 slower than AES. Our software implementation results are given in Table 3 .
Due to the fact that LED-x with 0 < x < 64 uses very similar operations as for LED-64, we expect they perform similarly which was confirmed by our implementations. Similarly, LED-x with 64 < x < 128 has similar software performance to LED-128 up to a difference of 2 cycles/byte. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the block cipher LED. Clearly, given its novelty, the cipher should not be used in applications until there has been sufficient independent analysis. Nevertheless, we hope that our design is of some interest and we have focused our attention on what seem to be the neglected areas of key schedule design and protection against relatedkey attacks. Furthermore, we have done so while working in one of the more challenging design spaces-that of constrained hardware implementation-and we have proposed one of the smallest block ciphers in the literature (for comparable choices of parameters) while striving to maintain a competitive performance in software. Additional information on LED will be made available via https://sites.google.com/site/ledblockcipher/ and we welcome all comments and analysis.
